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One of the most popular literary and cultural practices particularly in the digital age, “boys’ love” (BL, 
danmei 耽美) manga and fictional works are fantasies on romantic or homoerotic male-male relationships, 
and therefore are often naturally associated with homosexuality and pornography, two “morally” 
suspicious targets of government censorship in the heteronormative Chinese culture. This article aims to 
examine the various, indeed often opposite, strategies and tactics taken by BL participants and by some 
conscientious netizens on popular social media to illustrate how those who are under the threat of 
censorship grapple with harsh reality. In this article I argue that the BL practitioners’ responses to Chinese 
government’s anti-pornography campaigns are not simply a passive or reluctant “reaction.” I will first 
study the web adaptation of Priest’s BL story Zhenhun, demonstrating Priest’s as well as her fans’ tactful 
collaboration with the consumer culture and willing conformity to official discourse. Forming a sharp 
contrast with Priest’s commercial success, the controversial ten-year jail sentence of another BL writer, 
Gouwazi Tianyi, for profiting from producing and selling BL fiction has caused widespread outcry from 
both BL fans and ordinary netizens on Chinese social media. This case not only questions the dated 
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One of the most popular literary and cultural practices, particularly in the digital age, 
“boys’ love” (BL, a.k.a. danmei 耽美 in China) manga and fictional works, primarily 
by women and for women, are fantasies on romantic or homoerotic male-male 
relationships, and therefore are often naturally associated with homosexuality and 
pornography, two “morally” suspicious targets of government censorship in the 
heteronormative Chinese culture. At the same time, because of the fact that BL and 
its early-stage form, yaoi,1 often deal with teenage boys or minors, BL is also consid-
ered “virtual child pornography” and sometimes, debatably, paedophilia in many west-
ern countries which legally accept homosexuality and adult pornography (McLelland 
2005, 61–77). Anything not in the realm of official and mainstream cultures is by na-
ture subversive (and therefore dangerous), because of its distinctive difference from 
and transgression against the dominant culture. Although Chinese people are not un-
familiar with various forms of pornography in the history of literature, art, and religion 
(such as fangzhongshu 房中术, sexual practices in Daoism), China has a centuries-
long record of officially banning pornography (Yan 2014, 338). Under the current 
Criminal Law of China, article 363 lists the definition, circumstances, and penalties of 
the criminal offence of producing, possessing, duplicating, publishing, circulating or 
disseminating obscene articles (Zhongguo Renda wang 1997). Article 364(4) particu-
larly states that anyone who disseminates obscene articles to minors under the age of 
eighteen shall be severely punished, and a jail sentence up to ten years can be imposed. 
On the other hand, BL writers are mostly women in their twenties or thirties, while 
the age of its readers ranges from teenagers to readers in their thirties. Legally speaking, 
anyone who writes about erotic scenes in their BL works risks being punished for 
producing, publishing, selling, and disseminating obscene articles, and if their readers 
are under eighteen, their punishment will be even more severe. BL readers who pos-
sess, read, and circulate works containing obscene descriptions are also breaking the 
law, and if they circulate, sell, and trade such works to minors, they face severe pun-
ishment, too. However, Article 367 further states that medical and scientific works are 
not pornography, and that literature and art works with artistic value (yishu jiazhi 艺术
 
1
 Yaoi is an acronym for “yama nashi, ochi nashi, imi nashi,” or roughly “no climax, no resolution, no meaning.” 
Although it is a global label, it has been used particularly for male-male erotic manga and anime since early 1980s. 
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价值) can have graphic depictions of sexual conduct. However, the law does not clarify 
what criteria can be used to decide whether a work has artistic value. In other words, 
the current laws only provide a vague definition of “obscenity” as graphic depic-
tions/descriptions of sexual conduct or explicit pornography, excluding the highly sub-
jective cases with artistic value (Zhongguo Renda wang 1997; Yan 2014)
2
  
At the same time, there is currently no law in China regarding homosexuality or child 
pornography. I have argued elsewhere that although BL fiction is not gay fiction, the 
BL community has shown a strong sentiment towards understanding and supporting 
sexual minorities, whereas the government in recent years has become more cautious 
in drawing a delicate line between BL practice and homosexuality, addressing them 
differently when practising censorship (Tian 2020, 104–126). In other words, the gov-
ernment does not censor BL work explicitly for presenting same-sex relationships. It 
is also crucial to note that although there is no written law on any form of child por-
nography in China, in recent years BL communities across the country have voluntar-
ily condemned and policed stories involving sex with minors, adopting a zero tolerance 
policy (Yang 2019, 198). Hence, “pornography” (or “alleged pornography”) is the 
dominant factor that triggers government censorship of BL practice.  
As BL is a subcultural product and phenomenon primarily mediated by the Internet, 
the practice, fandom, and censorship of it mostly happen and appear in the cyber 
world. New media in the Internet age have unprecedentedly granted and enlarged 
individuals’ “speech space” and “public opinion space” (Qin 2018, 81). One’s tradi-
tional understanding of “Self” is also challenged and overridden by new technologies 
(Surratt 2001, 211). Among all the multiple new relationships that one builds up online 
and offline, fan identity is undoubtedly crucial for anyone (deeply) involved in popular 
culture (arguably any cultures). Like other fandoms, BL fandom in China, where the 
government takes pains to control cultural production to various degrees (Zhang and 
Zhang 2015, 200), first and foremost needs to secure its existence. As Weiyu Zhang 
(2016, 134) has observed, in China the politics of fandom is “a politics of survival first, 
then a politics of recognition,” especially under the harsh government censorship. 
However, many BL fans are not satisfied with merely being recognised by the official 
 
2
 Meining Yan (2014) discusses the regulations on pornography in mainland China in detail.  
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and mainstream cultures, even though recognition is not yet fully achieved. They are 
eager to “poach” and change the dominant culture,
3
 and to further participate in the 
production of dominant culture. BL fandom is never monolithic; the differences 
among fan communities are substantial. As Ling Yang and Yanrui Xu argued, “there 
is no unified response or resistance to state censorship. Each community has its own 
stakes, concerns and survival strategies” (Yang and Xu 2016, 165). Indeed, BL practi-
tioners’ responses to the Chinese government’s anti-pornography campaigns are not 
simply a passive or reluctant “reaction.” There is circumvention, conformity, and col-
laboration. There is also revulsion, resistance, and resilience. There is fear. There is 
also hope.  
BL writers, readers and publishers are in constant fear of violating the law, and thereby 
are constantly guessing and testing the bottom line of government censorship, espe-
cially by using various tactics and technologies. BL manga was first introduced to main-
land China in the early 1990s, both directly from Japan and via Taiwan, which had 
already been exposed to Japanese BL culture. Entering the 21st century, slash fiction 
in the English-speaking world joined the existing BL culture in China. The term “slash” 
refers to a fandom convention originating within the Star Trek franchise in the early 
1970s. Slash often depicts an erotic and romantic relationship between two originally 
straight male characters (such as Kirk/Spock or K/S) from popular media products. 
Thus, the Chinese BL fandom currently comprises three major circles: the original 
BL circle (yuandan quan, 原耽圈) that creates and consumes original Chinese-lan-
guage BL, the Japanese circle (rixi quan, 日系圈) that focuses on translation of Japa-
nese BL works and their fan works, and the Euro-American circle (oumei quan, 欧美
圈) that translates and creates slash works (Yang and Xu 2016, 165). Among these 
three prominent circles, as well as in the Chinese ACGN (Animation, Comic, Game, 
and Novel) world, the online literature, especially works produced by the original BL 
circle, is undoubtedly the most developed, and most visible to the dominant culture 
(Wang 2018, 86). The female-oriented online literature website Jinjiang wenxue cheng 
晋江文学城, or Jinjiang Literature City (henceforth Jinjiang), is one of the largest and 
 
3
 Henry Jenkins (1992) discusses the idea of “poaching” the dominant culture. 
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the most influential online literature websites in China, therefore the top target of gov-
ernment censorship, and consequently the one most cautiously practising self-censor-
ship. Both Jinjiang and its contracted writers have been more than once severely 
punished by the government; some of the writers have even ended up in jail (Yang and 
Xu 2016, 173–174). Therefore, teacher-student love affairs, bestiality, and sex with 
minors have been avoided in leading original BL websites like Jinjiang as a result of 
self-censorship since the 2014 anti-porn campaign (Yang and Xu 2016, 173). For years, 
Jinjiang has strictly applied the “above the neck” rule (bozi yishang 脖子以上), which 
means the most explicit description of intimacy and sexual behavior can only be kisses 
and caresses above the characters’ necks. However, as the conventional BL stories are 
made up of male-male romance and homoerotic elements, many readers are accus-
tomed to, and expect to see, more sexually-graphic scenes between the main characters. 
Under such circumstances, writers resort to other web platforms and/or private file-
sharing services, microblogging and social networking websites, such as Sina Weibo 
(henceforth Weibo), Wechat, and LOFTER (www.lofter.com), and other bulletin 
boards. Among all the alternative and supplementary platforms, Weibo is most often 
used by BL writers and fans, due to its large number of users, multiple functions and 
prominent social influence. However, precisely because of its increasing accessibility 
and social impact, Weibo has become notorious for over-practising censorship on its 
users.
4
 Technologically speaking, a pure text consisting of sequences of characters is 
much easier to censor than an image with text in it. Hence, BL writers first resorted to 
posting text images of the erotic scenarios of their works on Weibo, as supplements 
to the censored versions on Jinjiang. But in recent years, as technologies have devel-
oped, images with text can no longer easily pass censorship. To circumvent the image 
censorship, the users creatively come up with new tactics, such as posting upside-down 
or distorted images, or adding a sufficiently large border to the smallest dimension of 
the image (Huang 2020). 
Current studies on BL and censorship mainly focus on the impact of censorship on 
BL community and practice (Yi 2013; Jacob 2015, 113–114; Yang and Xu 2016). In 
 
4
 Weibo’s indiscriminate ban on BL content and  gay content caused a serious backlash from both its users and the 
government, resulting in the reversal of the ban on  BL and gay content two days after its release. See Tian 2020. 
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this article I will examine two cases that have affected a larger realm of Chinese culture 
and society, other than the fan circles only. I will first scrutinise a renowned BL writer, 
Priest, and the adaptation of her BL story Zhenhun 镇魂 (The Guardian 2018) into a 
highly successful web drama, demonstrating Priest’s as well as her fans’ tactful collab-
oration with consumer culture and willing conformity to official discourse. Forming a 
sharp contrast with Priest’s commercial success, the controversial ten-year jail sentence 
of another BL writer, Gouwazi Tianyi 狗娃子天一 (henceforth Tianyi), for profiting 
from producing and selling obscene BL fiction, showcases not only BL fans’ but also 
ordinary yet conscientious netizens’ responses on social media to severe censorship 
online and offline. Both cases under discussion have made themselves known to peo-
ple who may never have paid any attention to BL or any fandom, known as chuquan 
(出圈). As the following sections will show, these two cases demonstrate the ever com-
plex picture of subversive cultural practice negotiating with censorship as well as with 
any rigid system behind it. They have impacted and will continue to impact general 
BL practice and fandom as well as people’s expectations for social changes. I will par-
ticularly discuss the various, indeed often opposite, strategies and tactics undertaken 
by BL participants and by some conscientious netizens on Weibo to illustrate how 
those who are under the threat of censorship grapple with harsh reality. 
 
The Empowered Fans: The Success of Priest and “Zhenhun nühai” 
镇魂女孩 (The Guardian Girls)  
In discussing the Chinese government’s 2014 anti-porn campaign, Ling Yang and 
Yanrui Xu examine various tactics adopted by three major online BL communities, 
including “secretly nibbling away at government policy, voluntarily keeping a low pro-
file, behind-the-back complaints and so forth”(Yang and Xu 2016, 178). These strate-
gies are still prevalent among BL fans who have been considered “perverted” since the 
inception of the genre. Such an observation defines the nature of BL practice as “cau-
tious resistance and calculated conformity” (Yang and Xu 2016, 178) which inevitably 
emphasises the “reaction” and therefore “passivity” of the BL world when facing the 
antagonistic official and mainstream cultures. However, recent cases show that fans 
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can be more active in their dynamic with the official and mainstream cultures. In this 
section, I will examine the phenomenal success of the BL web drama Zhenhun, 
adapted from the 2012 novel of the same title by Priest, one of the best known BL 
writers. The web series was released on Youku 优酷, one of the leading video stream-
ing websites in China, on June 13, 2018. The series was so successful that by the time 
it ended in July 2018, it had garnered over 3 billion views on Youku. Until January 
2019, on the most influential Chinese social media site Weibo, the “super topic” 
hashtag #Wangban Zhenhun 网版镇魂 (webdrama Zhenhun) still remained the top 
popular topic in the TV series category, having 160.5 billion views and 511,000 posts. 
Even the party mouthpiece People’s Daily website recommended the drama for its 
“zhengnengliang” 正能量, or positive energy and influence (People.cn 2018). I will 
further argue that Zhenhun fans, self-proclaimed Zhenhun nühai, or Zhenhun girls, 
as well as the crucial role they played online in promoting the web drama, the novel, 
and the main actors, actively and strategically “poach” rather than passively respond to 
the mainstream and official cultures, in the hope of gaining recognition from the main-
stream culture and further participating in its production.  
Chinese original BL works have notoriously been the victims of plagiarism committed 
by writers of heterosexual romance. For years, due to government censorship, legisla-
tion, and general cultural discrimination, BL writers whose storylines/plots are “bor-
rowed” by heterosexual writers have not dared to take legal action and seek justice to 
protect their intellectual property, fearing that they would be prosecuted instead (Yang 
and Xu 2016, 178). On the other hand, BL writers have to endure the fact that the TV 
or web adaptations of BL works are often turned into heterosexual romances by the 
producer in order to pass censorship. To accomplish this, these adapted TV and web 
series usually add a completely new female main character as a love interest, or change 
one of the male characters to a supporting character. Dramas that dared to retain the 
original male-male romance have without exception been censored and banned, such 
as the total ban on the 2016 web drama Shangyin 上瘾 (Heroin, a.k.a. Addiction or 
Addicted). Under such circumstances, BL stories that do not elaborate on romantic 
relations and that do not contain graphic sexual depictions are more likely to pass 
censorship and find a niche in the mainstream market.  
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Priest’s stories naturally possess the advantages that facilitate success in a culture hostile 
to “abnormal” thoughts and deeds. Either because of her disposition and literary taste 
or commercial and ideological prudence, highly likely both, Priest has for years been 
well-known for writing “pure water” (qingshui 清水) BL stories. As opposed to “fleshy” 
(rou 肉) works, “pure water” stories do not contain any graphic sexual scenes. Actually, 
in recent years, rather than writing stories of romance between two men, Priest has 
been more interested in creating detective or fantasy works that loosely fall into the 
traditional “bromance” category. Her works do have a male couple but readers who 
do not favour same-sex romance can easily brush the romantic storyline aside without 
seriously ruining their reading pleasure. John Fiske points out that both fans and mun-
dane viewers draw and agree on a clear line between the fan community and the mun-
dane world. Knowledge of the target work determines if one is inside the fan circle or 
outside (Fiske 1992, 34–35 and 42–43). Hence, both Priest’s writing strategies and the 
above-mentioned adaptation practices attempt to transgress the boundaries between 
the fan community and the mundane world, or chuquan (出圈), and ultimately to gain 
economic and cultural capital from and in the mainstream culture.  
Moreover, Priest herself also keeps a low profile on the Internet. Like other online 
literature writers, she has a Weibo account and official fan clubs on QQ. But unlike 
most writers who actively interact with readers, show fans part of their daily lives 
through Weibo updates, or share their comments on hot social issues, Priest uses her 
Weibo account only as a means to advertise her work to a minimal degree, normally 
simply posting generic messages to inform readers that a new chapter has just been 
posted or a new book is about to come out. Such voluntary action to keep “a low 
profile,” as Yang and Xu point out, despite whatever Priest’s intentions may be, in 
reality effectively build up an image of a BL writer who is more interested in intriguing 
stories than homoerotic stories, and who focuses only on (commercial) writing and 
nothing else. As famous as she is, Priest voluntarily exerts minimal influence on her 
readers, and exists more like a popular writer “within the system.” Her political pru-
dence and “right” moral preference not only bring her commercial success while gar-
nering her millions of readers who may be sexually “transgressive”, but also allow her 
to walk the fine line between losing the BL essence and being censored. “Impersonal” 
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usage of public social media and keeping a low profile are effective strategies for self-
protection (and hence self-censorship) by the best-known web literature writers such 
as Priest, which help to avoid public discussion of the author and unnecessary interac-
tion with unknown netizens, and therefore reduce unwanted attention from both the 
government and other competitive players in the field. 
When Priest’s fantasy novel Zhenhun was adapted into a web series, the setting of the 
story was changed from China to alien planets, so the main characters are of alien 
races. More importantly, the main characters are only close friends sharing profound 
brotherly love. For ordinary audiences who have not read the fiction, the brotherly 
love between the two men may be slightly excessive but still “normal” in a society with 
a long history of homosocial practices like China. But for audiences who are book fans 
and know very well the “true” relationship between the main characters and the reason 
why a BL story has been changed to a bromance, their knowledge “increases the power 
of the fan to ‘see through’ to the production processes normally hidden by the text 
and thus inaccessible to the non-fan”(Fiske 1992, 43). The book-fans turned web-au-
diences therefore are empowered and superior, as they possess knowledge that is at 
once public and obvious (for the fans), and hidden and secret (for the non-fans).  
“Knowledge, like money, is always a source of power” (Fiske 1992, 43).
 
The Zhenhun 
fans who not only possess both public and hidden knowledge of the drama but also 
actively use such knowledge to advertise the book, the drama, and the main actors 
have created a special name and popular social media hashtag #Zhenhun nühai. The 
web series of Zhenhun was the bombshell of 2018 mainly because people were bewil-
dered by the fact that such a low-quality web drama suddenly went viral. The answer 
lies in the Zhenhun girls. Equipped with the “true” knowledge of the main characters, 
the Zhenhun girls excelled at decoding every single “normal” interaction between the 
two characters and were able to see the true love between them. Like most fans, they 
relished the subtle, sweet romantic exchange of the couple, and celebrated the veri-
similar performance of the main actors who bring the fictional characters to life. They 
also created fan videos, Zhenhun memes, paintings, and essays to advertise the series 
and the actors. Among all these typical fan activities, memes of the series and of the 
two characters invaded and occupied all popular social media platforms soon after the 
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drama was released. Even the official Weibo accounts of people.cn (2018) and the 
China Meteorological Administration used Zhenhun memes (Zhongguo qixiangju 
2018); the National Meteorological Center of CMA called the Zhenhun characters 
“zijiren” 自己人, or “our own people” (Zhongyang qixiangtai 2018). The wide usage 
of Zhenhun memes by official accounts showcases the successful infiltration of 
Zhenhun into the official and mainstream cultures. For the official culture, incorpo-
rating the latest products of popular culture may primarily be a means to popularise 
itself, adding a more “human face” to its commonly aloof image. However, appreciat-
ing, borrowing, recontexualising, and (re)creating (new) images of the Zhenhun char-
acters is undoubtedly a form of collusion with the BL and its fan culture, as it illustrates 
the broad range of transmediating the Zhenhun text and its media products into vari-
ous audiences’ own use. 
In order to further increase the publicity for the two actors, the Zhenhun girls created 
another hashtag #Zhenhun nühai C wei chudao 镇魂女孩 C位出道. “C wei chudao” 
is jargon used in the East Asian entertainment industry, imported from Korea. “C wei” 
is the “centre position of a group of actors” while “chudao” means one’s professional 
debut. Hence, only the best actor can occupy the centre spot on the stage. “Zhenhun 
nühai C wei chudao” aims at different goals, the first one of which apparently is the 
Zhenhun fans’ best wishes for the two actors as well as the Zhenhun show, hoping that 
they can be eminent actors in their careers. Moreover, since the subject of “C wei 
chudao” is the Zhenhun girls, they are actually the creators of the two rising stars (in 
reality, they are), and thereby the creators of a commercial commodity, which reverses 
the dynamics between fan culture and the cultural industries, from making fan culture 
out of cultural industries (Fiske 1992, 46–47) to producing commercial commodities 
for the cultural industries. In this sense, the Zhenhun girls achieved their goals when 
both actors were invited to participate in the 2019 Chinese New Year Gala, the most 
watched official New Year celebration. To everyone’s surprise, “Zhenhun nühai” 
eventually did “C wei chudao” and became the “stars” themselves, when they made 
their debut on the electronic billboards of the Twin Towers at Shanghai Global Bay 
after collecting 6.66 million “loves” from the VIP users of Youku (Jincuodao 2018). 
Hence, the creation and promotion of Zhenhun as well as the Zhenhun girls is an 
achievement in obtaining social and cultural identity and recognition that the BL fans 
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have never received from the dominant and official cultures. In other words, fans “per-
form their constructed selves” (De Kosnik 2016, 242 and 248). “Zhenhun nühai C 
wei chudao” is also a celebration of a new identity: these Zhenhun girls have trans-
formed themselves from fans who struggle to gain recognition from the mainstream 
culture to creators of mainstream culture. Zhenhun is indeed their (the Zhenhun girls’) 
show, as they rather than the producers of the drama possess the object of their love 
and enthusiasm (Fiske 1992, 40-41). In the summer of 2018, Zhenhun and the 
Zhenhun girls were indeed successfully lifted out of the fan circle, or chuquan, and 
dominated the cultural scene in China. 
Nevertheless, the fear of being censored is a constant concern for BL participants. Just 
like Priest’s hermetic attitude towards the public, fans also practice an ideal sharply 
contrasting with chuquan, the idea of quandi zimeng 圈地自萌, which literally means 
“claiming your own land, enjoying yourself on your own ‘territory’.” “Quandi zimeng” 
underscores a “closed-door,” self-protective strategy adopted by fans who do not want 
to be judged and interfered with by people from other fan circles and from the mun-
dane world. The idea also emphasises the basic freedom that everyone should enjoy, 
even though sometimes it can be used as a safe haven for illegal activities. As men-
tioned above, “quandi zimeng” apparently runs at odds with the Zhenhun girls’ 
chuquan ambitions, but it never recedes from the Zhenhun fans’ minds. When 
Zhenhun and its hashtags swept the Internet, many fans as well as the producers started 
to worry that the drama might have been too successful and drawn unnecessary atten-
tion from government censors. The fans therefore voluntarily abandoned one of the 
most trending hashtags used by the drama, hashtag #Shehuizhuyi xiongdiqing 社会主
义兄弟情, socialist brotherly love, to avoid being mixed up with other BL dramas and 
becoming implicated, and also to try not to make fun of anything “socialist.” Despite 
the fans’ proactive moves to “cool down the heat”, eight days after the final episode 
was aired, the Zhenhun series was removed from Youku on August 2, 2018, for un-
known reasons. If the government does not give clear reasons for its actions, its ban 
on the Zhenhun series is more likely intended to regulate and restrain the fan power 
than to police the text, because of “the dominant culture’s need to maintain the disci-
plinary distance between the text and reader” (Fiske 1992, 41). The cultural capital 
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produced by the fans is dangerous and subversive for a government that strives to 
instruct its people on living “morally and positively”, and that has been increasingly 
emphasising the didactic message of literature and art, unwilling to recognise their 
function as pure entertainment. However, as shown above, in their contest with the 
government, the Zhenhun fans and the cultural commodities they have produced 
clearly “poach” the official culture and beat the government policy, especially when, 
after additional edits and revisions, the drama was back on Youku on November 10, 
immediately receiving over 52 million views for its playback in seven days (Xunyee 
2018).  
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that no matter how many “romantic moments” 
the fans decoded from the series, the web drama Zhenhun does not violate the tight-
ened regulations on the production of film, TV, press, and radio. At the same time, 
censoring a drama in which an actor plays does not necessarily lead to the censoring 
of the actor. For example, although the web drama Shangyin was banned in China, 
the main actor Huang Jingyu’s career took off, and he has been highly recognised by 
the official culture after playing a series of patriarchal roles in several nationalist films. 
In this sense, the success of Zhenhun actors and the Zhenhun girls should be better 
seen as a “reward” by the official culture for voluntarily and creatively following the 
official rules and helping the official culture recruit, incorporate, and tame subversive 
powers.  
 
Restless “Monkeys”: The Tianyi Case Controversy 
Like a patriarch, if the official culture rewards its docile children, of course it punishes 
the naughty ones. As most BL practitioners celebrated the success of Zhenhun, in the 
same year many were chilled by the Tianyi case. In November 2017, BL writer Tianyi 
was arrested, and on October 31, 2018, sentenced to ten years and six months in jail, 
for making and selling obscene articles for profit. According to the official report, 
Tianyi made 150,000 yuan profit selling erotic BL books written by her. Although 
there are many cases of online literature writers being arrested for writing and selling 
“pornographic” content, the news usually shakes and affects mainly the online 
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literature community. Tianyi’s case differs from all the previous ones in that it 
immediately drew public attention and has caused a widespread outcry from both BL 
fans and ordinary netizens on Chinese social media, for its sentence seems too heavy 
for such a “minor” crime. In other words, it is a chuquan case that has a larger social 
impact. In this section, I will discuss the responses from Tianyi’s sympathisers and the 
strategies they adopted in an attempt to influence the judge’s opinion on Tianyi’s 
appeal, as well as the consequent challenges to China’s outdated state apparatus and 
problematic social institutions. These challenges may not lead to immediate social 
change, but they have undoubtedly planted seeds of bottom-up democracy in the 
younger generations.  
In Tianyi’s case, one of her books, Gongzhan 攻占 (Occupy), was the main source of 
the profit that she made. Gongzhan is about a homoerotic relationship between a high 
school teacher and his seventeen-year-old student. This book is classified “Gao H” 高
H among BL stories. “Gao H” is a combination of the Chinese word gao (high) and 
the Japanese word hentai 変態 in ACGN culture, meaning highly sexually abnormal. 
Homoerotic content (sometimes between/with minors) has characterised Japanese 
yaoi and Anglo-American slash practices, and has been an essential category in 
Chinese BL, despite government censorship. Therefore, Tianyi’s Gongzhan is not a 
unique case among non-compliant BL participants. Due to the heavy censorship, 
legally publishing BL works in China is almost impossible. For years, well-received 
works have been published in either Taiwan or Hong Kong, or made into high quality 
private publications without obtaining an ISBN from the government in China. Tianyi 
is not the first or last writer self-publishing her work; nor has she made the most profit 
among self-published writers.
5
 She took the road that many BL writers have taken, 
only with less caution and less luck. Under such circumstances, the government 
adeptly used the old trick of “killing the chicken to teach the monkeys a lesson” (shaji 
jinghou 杀鸡警猴) to make an example of Tianyi.  
However, rather than being intimidated, the “monkeys” were immediately enraged. 
As social media platforms like Weibo have become a tool for people to draw public 
 
5
 For more information on arrested and/or sentenced BL writers, see Yang 2019, 212–213. 
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attention and further seek justice, Tianyi’s sympathisers also resorted to a public 
appeal in the hope of influencing the judge’s opinion on her case. Nevertheless, the 
public responses and tactics ranged widely, from conformism to democratic 
reformism, demonstrating the fundamentally divided views on the state apparatus and 
social institutions. For the moderates, writing highly homoerotic BL stories is legally 
and morally wrong, and Tianyi deserves to be punished for making and circulating 
obscene materials. But they recognise that the pertinent laws were made in 1998 when 
making a profit of 30,000 to 50,000 yuan was considered a “serious crime”, and a 
profit of 150,000 yuan (Tianyi’s case) “extremely serious.” However, as the Chinese 
economy has developed so fast in the past two decades, making a profit of 150,000 
yuan can no longer be considered a serious crime in the public eye. Therefore the 
moderates suggest respecting the law but focus on persuading the judge that such a 
degree of penalty is too harsh for a young woman who simply wants to make a living. 
Thinking along this line, many others are afraid that a public appeal may irritate the 
government and cause a further crackdown; they “kindheartedly” suggest that BL 
writers should practise tighter self-censorship to avoid inviting unnecessary trouble 
(Beida wenxue luntan. 2018). Such pragmatic views aim to protect as many as possible 
within the state apparatus, whereas “truth” and “justice” are not the priority.  
In her analyses of the philosophy of the ACGN world and fandom, Yusu Wang 
suggests that for younger generations the existing orders represent certainty, and a 
“normal” world that one falsely believes to exist. The young people prefer to accept 
and respect any existing law and order not because these are more just and/or more 
reasonable, but simply because following them is easy and simple, and such actions 
are protected by the state apparatus (Wang 2018, 101). Wang calls this tendency to 
avoid responsibility and to follow orders a kind of cynicism (Wang 2018, 101). Sue 
Curry Jansen also tells us that “the Powerful do not just have the first and last say. They 
do not just control access to podium, presidium, or press room. They also determine 
the rules of evidence, shape the logic of assertion, define the architecture of arguments” 
(Jansen 1988, 7). To respect the existing law on pornography is to accept the rationale 
and procedure of defining and identifying pertinent crime, and to follow the official 
logic on regulating the press and publishing. It not only illustrates the cynicism of a 
group/generation of people, but also unfolds in front of us how the official education 
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system has successfully and systematically affected and trained its receivers’ way of 
perceiving the world, analysing the sources of information, and processing evidence. 
After all, the law is rather a human institution that changes from time to time than an 
immutable guardian and representation of justice and truth.  
Veteran writers like Priest unfortunately showcase the social reality analysed above. 
Unlike what the People’s Daily  web account suggested in its complimentary 
comments, Priest does not demonstrate “positive power and influence.” At best, she 
provides the masses and fans with an example of how to be commercially successful 
in a censored world. At worst, she helps to create an illusion and blind confidence that 
the existing censorship does not punish people for no good reason. At the same time, 
following the official regulations points to the fans’ desire to enter or self-identify with 
the “normal” mainstream culture and the mundane world. It also shows the dilemma 
of resorting to public opinion and democratic force in a country with a long history 
and experience of censorship. Massive and strong public opinion on certain issues in 
China is always at the risk of becoming “sensitive” and being treated as “democratic 
protest”, and therefore suffering a severe backlash from the authorities.  
On the other hand, many BL practitioners, especially less commercialised writers and 
readers, regard Tianyi’s penalty as deliberately targeting marginalised cultures—online 
literature and BL culture—for the following reasons: 1) Under the current judicial 
system, in practice, laws are not effectively applied to the ubiquitous adult ads on social 
media. 2) The current laws on the definition of pornography and obscenity are too 
vague. Whether a depiction of graphic sex is obscene is determined by its aesthetic 
value, while aesthetic value belongs to a highly subjective realm. In fact, many readers 
give personal experiences of reading classic literature as pornography. 3) It is the 
government’s duty to establish and develop rating systems for film, TV shows, books, 
and other online content, but lacking such systems, the government punishes victims 
for its own wrong-doings (Shijiu yaoyiyao 2018a). A total ban on obscene content 
inevitably reduces adults to reading or communicating only what is fit for children 
(Heins 2007, 166). 4) Pornography is not harmful, and there is no scientific or 
psychological evidence proving it has a negative impact on adolescent development. 5) 
The government has amended or revised many laws in recent years, such as by 
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reducing the penalty on tax evasion and bribery, but never revisits laws on producing, 
publishing, selling, and circulating obscene articles, for which the penalty remains 
sentences from ten years to life (Wang Zhenyu lüshi 2018). 6) There is still no law 
against any form of child pornography. Real life child pornography and sexual 
harassment have been largely ignored and denied in the conservative culture. The 
public is particularly incensed by the sharp contrast between the Tianyi case and the 
well-known actress Fan Bingbing’s tax evasion case of the same year: Tianyi was 
sentenced to more than ten years in jail for making a profit of 150,000 yuan, while Fan 
Bingbing was fined totally 890 million yuan for unpaid taxes and penalties without 
serving a single day in jail (Xinhuanet 2018). Tianyi’s case not only touches a nerve 
with the public on legislation, demonstrating the increasing social injustice, inequality, 
and corruption that many Chinese experience daily, but also reveals that patriarchy is 
deeply rooted in the society and its institutions. Tianyi’s sympathisers compare this 
case with how real child pornography, real paedophilia, domestic violence, child abuse, 
and rape are ignored and/or receive little penalty in life (Sohu 2018), pointing to the 
fundamental paradox between the deep fear of sexual freedom as well as lack of sex 
education in the society and the fierce encouragement of marriage and reproduction 
by the government as well as by the conservative, patriarchal culture. When the 
discussion goes beyond the ACGN world, it transgresses the boundary between 
fandom and the mundane world, creating a temporary common ground and solidarity 
among marginalised groups, victims of the patriarchal institutions, and the down-
trodden in general. Through Tianyi’s case, social media connect individuals of various 
identities, and offer them a platform to vent their dissatisfaction with the increasingly 
sensed social injustice and institutional corruption. 
Had such public discussions successfully “evolved into formally organized collectivities, 
in which roles, norms, and tradition become fixed”, they would lead to social changes 
(Zhang 2016, 5). But if the means of communication were not available, they would 
never form any new social entities. Not long after Tianyi’s case appeared on the 
public’s radar and evoked heated discussions, the government took a series of actions 
to crack down further on the BL community, such as deleting Weibo accounts and 
posts, banning BL websites, and policing publishers. More importantly, on many 
social media platforms, such as Weibo, Douban, and Jinjiang, more users have started 
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to report pornographic or inappropriate content to the authorities through the easy-
to-use report mechanism.
6
 The last action is detrimental in every respect. In the past, 
there was an unwritten agreement and mutual trust between writers and readers. The 
writers took risks and employed various means to provide the readers with “sensitive” 
content, and believed that the readers would secretly enjoy the difficult-to-produce 
fruits and together protect the authors. BL fans also believed that trading and 
circulating “sensitive” materials were merely personal deeds, as they did not cause any 
harm to the public. But after the government reinforced the laws and regulations on 
pornography and obscene articles and applied more easy-to-use report mechanisms, 
anyone—a homophobic netizen, a concerned parent, a grudging reader, a jealous 
competitor, a moralist, an ordinary person who wants to make a little money—can 
secretly report anyone who produces, circulates, possesses, or trades BL works with 
or without pornographic content. Tipping off the authorities about someone on the 
Internet has never been so easy, whereas clearing one’s name has never been so hard. 
One may eventually prove to be not guilty, but the time and money invested are 
priceless, while the “whistle blower” does not suffer any penalty for providing false 
information. Fearful of being reported and wrongly punished, writers quickly deleted 
their old posts on document-sharing websites, publishers halted ongoing projects, and 
readers did not dare circulate previously-saved works to other unknown fans, all 
resulting in a new round of self-censorship. Although Jinjiang is notorious for its self-
censorship and complete conformity with the government regulations, at the time of 
writing, in May 2019, it was once again reported by an unknown person to the 
authorities for having published works containing pornographic content. On May 23, 
2019, Jinjiang announced via its Weibo account that two of the sections (those where 
the alleged pornographic works were published) under pre-modern BL stories would 
be closed immediately for fifteen days, so that the whole website could further 
scrutinise its works (Jinjiang wenxuecheng 2019). On May 24, Bingxin 冰心, the top 
administrator of Jinjiang, informed the public on Weibo that she was safely back home 
 
6
 Rumours indicated that the authorities increased the reward money given to citizens who report pornographic 
content to police. But one can never verify such “behind the scenes” information from the government.  
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(from arrest and/or police interrogation). More importantly, she warned the writers 
and readers that: 
As long as you write about sexual conduct, sexual thoughts or any description 
related to sexual organs, be it long or short, concrete or stream of consciousness, 
using substitute adjectives or metaphors, about one person or the intercourse 
between two, as long as others can tell that it is about sex, it is of high risk. The 
book that has been reported and banned contains a paragraph of fewer than 
four hundred characters; there is no specific sexual organ mentioned, no inter-







She therefore pleaded with the writers and readers to apply higher regulation and self-
censorship, not to attempt to write anything involving sex to the slightest degree, and 
to report to the website authority if they see anyone writing about sex. She emphasised 
that reporting pornography is not personal revenge or fierce competition among 
writers; it is being responsible for oneself and for all the writers at Jinjiang (Bingxin 
2019). In other words, if one does not practise full-scale (self) censorship, it is likely 
that others who write at Jinjiang as well as the website itself eventually will be (has 
already been as reality shows) implicated and heavily punished. Bingxin was right in 
her pessimistic prediction: two months later Jinjiang was completely shut down for 
fifteen days, for full-fledged self-censorship and pertinent technical upgrades 
(Guanliyuan 2019). 
Encouraging tip-offs not only “purifies” (jinghua净化) the Internet as the government 
aims to do, and destroys the mutual trust shared by the fan communities, but also 
challenges one’s belief in humanity and one’s hope for a good future. Reader 冷死辣
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崽(Lengsi lazai) commented on the Tianyi case and the government censorship under 
BL writer 十九瑶一瑶’s (Shijiu yaoyiyao) Weibo post: 
Sadly many people think this has nothing to do with them. Allow me to be blunt: 
when every historical incident happened, the masses thought it was an ordinary 





The writer replied: 
Everyday (he/she) watched someone being decapitated, and then went back 
home, saying how this person deserved death. Fewer and fewer people were 
left, until one day (himself/herself) was beheaded… That’s how things go.  
每天围观一次菜市口砍头，然后回家嗑瓜子，说这人死的怎么怎么活
该，直到人越来越少，某天自己也被拎去砍头……大致如此。(Shijiu 
yaoyiyao 2018b)  
The masses’ numbness, stupidity, and enthusiasm for spectacle-watching 
unsurprisingly reminded people of Lu Xun’s well-known works on the Chinese 
national character a hundred years ago. Such a dismaying analogy is echoed in a post 
by another writer 十九岁子弹  (Shijiusui zidan), who wrote, “What makes me 
heartbroken is that I am only in my twenties but have already found out the world is 
rotten to the core, but I have to continue to live.”
7
 Renowned BL writers are more 
cautious (interestingly, everything remained normal and peaceful in Priest’s Weibo 
posts). For example author 徐徐图之 (Xuxu tuzhi) thanked her readers for their 
inquiries and comfort, and very obscurely yet humorously suggested that: 
 
7
 The original text was post on November 17, 2018, but it was deleted later.  
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This harsh winter is cold, stay warm. Go to bed early and get up early…drink 
more hot water, and spend less money. I hope tomorrow is a good day. Thank 
you.  
寒冬天冷，大家多穿衣，早睡早起…多喝热水，省着点花。希望明天是
个好天气，谢谢你们。 (Xuxu tuzhi 2018) 
Her followers immediately decoded the message, knowing that she suggested that they 
keep safe and not buy BL books, at least for a while. This sense of disillusionment 
first and foremost enhances the opposition between BL fans and the official and 
dominant cultures. It also further complicates BL fandom and practice, and creates a 
sentiment of dystopian carnival. Some BL practitioners may hope to achieve more 
successes like Zhenhun by severe self-censorship, some may shed tears with Tianyi, 
and others may enjoy whatever they can get and lament the “good old days” (in fact 
BL days have never been good) before the apocalypse. Tianyi’s case and people’s 
various responses to the government’s actions once again demonstrate that the BL 
world is full of different and sometimes opposite views and practices, and its 
complicated dynamic with the government censorship illustrates the younger 
generations’ understandings and expectations of their country’s future.  
 
Conclusion 
Because of their political naiveté, their cynicism, and their idealism, but also because 
of their successes and failures, participants in different BL communities have formed 
a paradoxical relationship with government censorship and the state apparatus. On the 
one hand, they look for public recognition and acceptance. On the other hand, they 
strive to keep their unique and subversive features, resisting assimilation by the domi-
nant culture. They are eager to be the owners and producers of their own culture, but 
they voluntarily offer free cultural labour to and are used by the dominant culture. 
They are the victims of censorship. They can also be the collaborators with and con-
tributors to censorship. They witness, experience, survive, or perish. But ultimately, 
many of them are enlightened (and perhaps disillusioned at the same time), which has 
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planted seeds of courage for some to question and challenge what the government has 
told them, and to fight for a better future. Practice always appears to precede censor-
ship. History and reality have shown us that although the government may take all 
kinds of actions to reinforce its censorship, it is always one step behind people’s prac-
tice, and always one step behind their circumvention. I believe that as both BL practice 
and government censorship evolve, the dynamics between the two will only become 
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